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This contribution argues that the notion of time used in the scientific modeling of reality deprives
time of its real nature. Difficulties from logic paradoxes to mathematical incompleteness and nu-
merical uncertainty ensue. How can the emergence of novelty in the Universe be explained? How
can the creativity of the evolutionary process leading to ever more complex forms of life be captured
in our models of reality? These questions are deeply related to our understanding of time. We argue
here for a computational framework of modeling that seems to us the only currently known type of
modeling available in Science able to capture aspects of the nature of time required to better model
and understand real phenomena.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its origin more than two millennia ago, epistemo-
logical thinking in the West has been driven by a desire
to find a way to certify knowledge as certain. Mathemat-
ics and logic seemed to offer a template for certainty, and
as a consequence, modern science as it emerged from the
work of scholars like Galileo and Newton aimed as much
as possible for mathematical formalization. But by the
beginning of the twentieth century the certainty of logic
and mathematics was no longer an unquestioned truth:
it had become a research question. From paradoxes in
the foundations of logic and mathematics to equations
with solutions that are in a sense unknowable, certainty
had begun to seem rather uncertain. By the 1930s, as
mathematicians and logicians grappled with the problem
of formalisation, they found themselves being forced to
look beyond formal systems, and to contemplate the pos-
sibility that the solution was of a different nature than
they had imagined, that the answers lay in the realm
of the living, creative world — the world of uncertainty.
Although they did not systematically pursue this line of
thought, we believe that their intuition was essentially
correct, and it serves as our starting point.
The basic reason for the failure of the formalisation
programme, we contend, has to do with the inherent
nature of logic and mathematics, the very quality that
makes these fields so attractive as the source of certainty:
their timelessness. Logic and mathematics, as formal sys-
tems, exist outside of time; hence their truths are timeless
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– they are eternal and certain. But because they exclude
time, they are unable to represent one of the most fun-
damental characteristics of the world: its creativity, its
ability to generate novel structures, processes, and enti-
ties.
Bergson [1], by the beginning of the twentieth century,
was already deeply bothered by the inability of mathe-
matics and formal science to handle the creativity that is
ubiquitous in the living world, and he believed that this
was due to the use of “abstract” time — a representation
of time — rather than “concrete” or real time. In spite
of his perceptive analysis of the problem, however, he
saw no real solution. In effect mathematics and the hard
sciences would be unable to address the phenomenon of
life because there was no way they could embody real
or natural time [2] in their formal and theoretical struc-
tures. Real time could only be intuited, and intuition fell
outside the realm of hard science. This view had been
anticipated by Goethe [3, 4], who took metamorphosis as
the fundamental feature of nature. Implicitly recognising
that formal systems could not encompass metamorpho-
sis, he proposed a scientific methodology based on the
development of an intuition of the phenomena by means
of immersion in them. A recent echo of Bergson is found
in the work of Latour [5], who argues that existence in-
volves continuous re-creation in real (natural) time, while
the representations of science short-circuit this process of
constructive transformation by enabling direct jumps to
conclusions. He cleverly refers to this time-eliminating
aspect of science as “double clic”.
The solution to the problem of time, we believe, is to
re-introduce real, natural time into formal systems. Berg-
son did not believe there was any way of doing this, be-
cause science was essentially tied to mathematics or other
2systems of abstraction which seemed always to eliminate
real time. Today, however, we can introduce real or natu-
ral time into our formal systems by representing the sys-
tems as algorithms and executing them on a computer,
which because it operates in natural time, introduces nat-
ural time into the algorithm. The answer, in other words,
lies in computing. (In this chapter we will normally use
the expression natural time rather than real time in or-
der to avoid confusion with the common use of the latter
expression to refer to something happening immediately,
as in ”a real time solution”.)
This contribution will develop the argument that var-
ious difficulties that arise in logic and formal scientific
modelling point to the necessity of introducing natural
time itself into our formal treatment of science, mathe-
matics, and logic. We first discuss some of the difficul-
ties in logic and scientific theory that arise either from a
failure to include time in the formal system, or if it is in-
cluded, from the way it is represented. We then provide
examples of the explanatory power that becomes avail-
able with the introduction of natural time into formal
systems. Finally, the last part of the contribution offers
an outline of the way forward.
II. THE ROLE OF TIME IN MATHEMATICS
AND SCIENCE
By the end of the nineteenth century the question of
the certainty of mathematics itself was being raised. This
led initially to efforts to show that mathematics could be
formalised as a logical system. Problems in the form of
paradox soon emerged in this programme, and those dif-
ficulties in turn led to attempts to demonstrate that the
programme was at least feasible in principle. However
those attempts also failed when it was proven that math-
ematics must contain unprovable or undecidable proposi-
tions. The result was that mathematics came to resemble
an archipelago of certainties surrounded by a sea of logi-
cally necessary uncertainty. Moreover, with the discovery
of the phenomenon of deterministic chaos emerging in the
classic three body problem, uncertainties emerged even
within the islands of established mathematics. Mean-
while, in physics, while thermodynamics had long seemed
to be somehow problematic because of the nature of en-
tropy, at least it produced deterministic laws. During the
second half of the 20th century, however, it was shown
by Prigogine [6, 7] and others [8] that these laws are
special cases, and that there are no laws governing most
phenomena arising in such systems, because the phenom-
ena of interest arise when the systems are far from ther-
modynamic equilibrium, whereas the laws describe the
equilibrium state. At the same time, in biology, there
was a growing realisation that living systems exist in the
energetic realm in which the traditional laws of thermo-
dynamics are of only limited use. And with the discovery
that DNA is the genetic material of life, much of biology
was transformed into what might be termed the infor-
matics of life.
All of these developments have in common that they
introduced, irrevocably and in a radical way, uncertainty
and unpredictability into mathematics and science. They
also have in common that they arose from attempts to
ensure certainty and predictability by keeping time, real
time, out of the formal explanatory systems. To a large
extent, in the practice of everyday science, these develop-
ments have been ignored. Science continues to focus on
those areas where certainty seems to be attainable. How-
ever, many of the most interesting and important prob-
lems are ones that grow out of the uncertainties that have
been uncovered over the past century: problems like the
origin and nature of life, the nature of creative processes,
and the origin of novel processes and entities. These tend
to be treated discursively rather than scientifically. How-
ever, we believe that it is now possible to develop formal
treatments of problems like these by including time —
real, natural time rather than any formal representation
of it — in the explanatory mechanism. This will also
mean recognising that a certain degree of uncertainty
and unpredictability is inherent in any scientific treat-
ment of these problems. But that would be a strength
rather than a failure, because uncertainty and indeter-
minacy are inherent characteristics of these systems, and
so any explanatory mechanism that doesn’t generate an
appropriate degree of unpredictability is a misrepresen-
tation. Creativity itself cannot be timeless, but it relies
on the timeless laws of physics and chemistry to produce
new phenomena that transcend those laws without vio-
lating them. In the next four sections we discuss in more
detail the role of time in the treatment of paradox, incom-
pleteness, uncertainty, and emergence in order to justify
the necessity of including natural time itself rather than
formal time in our explanatory systems.
A. Paradox
By the end of the 19th century the desire to show that
mathematics is certain had led to Hilbert’s programme
to show that mathematics could be recast as a syntac-
tical system, one in which all operations were strictly
“mechanical” and semantics played a minimal role. In
this spirit, Frege, Russell and Whitehead reduced several
branches of mathematics to logic, thus apparently justify-
ing the belief that the programme was feasible. However,
Russell’s work produced a paradox in set theory that ul-
timately raised doubts about it. Russell’s paradox asks if
the set of all sets that do not contain themselves contains
itself. Paradoxically, if it doesn’t, then it does; if it does,
then it doesn’t. Several solutions have been proposed to
rid logic of this paradox, but there is still some debate as
to whether any of them is satisfactory [9].
The paradox seems to emerge because of the time-free
nature of logic. If we treat the process described in the
analysis as an algorithm and execute it, then the output
is an endless oscillation. Does the set contain itself? First
3it doesn’t, then it does, then it doesn’t, . . . . There is no
contradiction. This oscillation depends on our working
in discontinuous time — in this case the time of the com-
puter’s clock. We can in principle make the clock speed
arbitrarily fast, but if we could go to the limit of contin-
uous time in operating the computer we would see the
paradox re-emerge as something analogous to a quantum
superposition: since the superposition endures it doesn’t
depend on time, and independent of time, the value is
always both ’does’ and ’doesn’t’. However, if we were to
observe the state of the system at a particular instant, the
superposition would collapse to a definite but arbitrary
value — “does” or “doesn’t” — just as Schroedinger’s fa-
mous cat is only definitively alive or dead when the box
is opened.
Of course a computer must work with a finite clock
speed and so the paradox cannot appear. This resolution
of the paradox by casting it as an algorithm to be exe-
cuted in natural time emphasizes the difference between
the existence of a set and the process of constructing the
set, a difference that echoes Prigogine’s [6], [7, p. 320] dis-
tinction between being and becoming. In the algorithmic
construction of the set, the size of the set oscillates be-
tween n and n+1, sizes that correspond to “doesn’t” and
“does”. Most well known paradoxes are similar to Rus-
sell’s in that they involve self-reference. However, Yablo
[10, pp. 24-25] has demonstrated one that is non-self-
referential; but it, too, yields an oscillation (true, false,
true, false . . . ) if executed as an algorithm.
B. Incompleteness
Whereas Russell discovered a paradox that cast doubt
on the possibility of demonstrating that mathematics is a
purely syntactical system, both Go¨del and Turing came
up with proofs that even to the extent that it is syntac-
tical, it is impossible to demonstrate that it is. Go¨del
showed that even for a relatively limited deductive sys-
tem there were true statements that couldn’t be proven
true within the system. In order to prove those state-
ments, the system would have to be enlarged in some way,
for example with additional axioms. But in this enlarged
system there would again appear true statements that
were not provable within it. This result highlighted the
degree to which mathematics as it existed depended not
only on axioms and logical deduction — that is, syntax—
but also on the products of what was called mathematical
intuition — the source of new concepts and procedures
introduced to deal with new problems or problems that
were otherwise intractable. In other words, mathemat-
ics was progressively extended by constructions based on
these intuitions. The intuitions came with semantic con-
tent, which Go¨del’s result implicitly suggested could not
be eliminated, even in principle.
But there was another problem. Go¨del, like Hilbert,
thought of deduction as a mechanical procedure; thus
the idea of certainty was closely linked to the idea of
a machine operating in a completely predictable man-
ner. Of course at the time the idea was metaphorical;
the deductions would actually be carried out by a person
(the person was invariably referred to as a computer),
but for the results to be reliable, the person would have
to follow without error a precise sequence of operations
that would yield the desired result; in other words, for
each deduction the person would have to execute an al-
gorithm. Thus the algorithm was implicitly part of the
logical apparatus used to generate mathematics. It was
clear to Turing and Church that a formal understanding
of the nature of these algorithms was necessary. To that
end Turing formulated what is now known as the Turing
machine (at the time, of course — 1937 — it was purely
conceptual), and at about the same time Church devel-
oped an equivalent approach, the lambda calculus. An
algorithm was considered legitimate as a procedure if it
could be described as a Turing machine or formulated
in the lambda calculus. Each algorithm corresponded
to a particular Turing machine. A Turing machine was
required to have a finite number of states, and a proof
calculated on the machine would need to finish in a finite
number of steps. By proving that it could not in gen-
eral be shown whether or not algorithms would execute
in a finite number of steps (the halting problem), Tur-
ing demonstrated, in results analogous to Go¨del’s, that
some propositions were not provable. Church arrived at
the same result using his lambda calculus. The results
of Go¨del, Turing, and Church showing that it is impos-
sible to prove that a consistent mathematical system is
also complete are complementary to Russell’s discovery
of the paradox in set theory, which suggests that an at-
tempt to make a formal system complete will introduce
an inconsistency.
Turing presumably imposed the restrictions of finite
machine states and finite steps in order to ensure that
Turing machines would be close analogues of the recur-
sive equations which were the standard at that time for
computing proofs. These restrictions on the Turing ma-
chine were necessary conditions for proof, but as his re-
sults showed, they did not amount to sufficient condi-
tions. In making these assumptions he effectively re-
stricted the machines to producing time-free results. This
was entirely reasonable given that his goal was to formal-
ize a procedure for producing mathematical results which
were themselves timeless. Nevertheless he found the re-
strictions to be somewhat problematic, as did Church
and Go¨del, because they meant that a Turing machine
could not capture the generation of the new concepts
and procedures that flowed from the exercise of mathe-
matical intuition by mathematicians. There was much
informal discussion of this issue, including possibilities
for circumventing the limitations. Turing suggested that
no single system of logic could include all methods of
proof, and so a number of systems would be required for
comprehensive results. Stating this thought in terms of
Turing machines, he suggested a multiple machine the-
ory of mind — mind because he was still thinking of the
4computer as a person, and the machine as the algorithm
that the person would follow mechanically. The mul-
tiple machine idea was that Turing machines would be
chained, so that different algorithms would be executed
sequentially, thus overcoming some of the limitations of
the simple Turing machine. How would the sequence
be determined? Initially the idea was that it would be
specified by the mathematician, but subsequently other
methods were proposed, ranging from stochastic choice
to a situation in which each machine would choose the
subsequent machine. Eventually Turing proposed that
learning could provide the basis of choice. He observed
that mathematics advances by means of mathematicians
exercising mathematical intuition, which they then use
to create new mathematics, a process he thought of as
learning. He then imagined a machine that could learn
by experience, by means of altering its own algorithms.
(Copeland and Shagrir, 2015)
Time had been kept out of mathematics by defining it
as consisting only of the achieved corpus of results and ig-
noring the process by which those results were generated.
Turing and Church took a first step toward including the
process by formalizing the treatment of the algorithms
by which proofs were derived. But this did not seem to
them (or others) to be sufficient, because it did not cap-
ture the deeply creative nature of mathematics as seen
in the continual introduction of new concepts and proce-
dures that established whole new areas of mathematics.
We might interpret the journey from Turing algorithm
to learning as an implicit recognition of the necessity of
natural time in mathematics. On the other hand, while
Turing had formalized the proof process in terms of a ma-
chine which would have to operate in natural time, the
machine was defined in such a way that the results that it
produced would be time free. Thus in postulating strate-
gies like chained Turing machines to represent learning,
he probably assumed that the results would also be time
free. However, if mathematics is understood to include
the process by which it is created, it will have to involve
natural time, even if the result of that creative process
is time free. While Turing spoke of learning, a more ap-
propriate term might be creativity, and creativity — the
emergence of something new — necessarily involves time.
C. Uncertainty
But is mathematics, in the narrower sense of estab-
lished results, really entirely timeless? Perhaps. But
there is at least one small part of it — deterministic chaos
— that seems to be trying to break free and take up res-
idence in natural time. The phenomenon was discovered
by Henri Poincare´ at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury as he attempted to solve the Newtonian three-body
problem. An equation that exhibits deterministic chaotic
dynamics can, up to a point, be treated as a timeless
structure and its properties investigated using standard
mathematical techniques (some invented by Poincare´ for
this purpose). It has been shown, for example, that the
attractor is a fractal object, and therefore infinitely com-
plicated. As a consequence the solution trajectory cannot
be written explicitly. It can, however, be calculated nu-
merically — but only up to a point: since the attractor,
as a fractal, is infinitely complex, we can never know ex-
actly where the system is on it, and hence cannot predict
the future states of the system.
Take one of the simplest possible cases, the difference
equation version of the logistic function:
Xt+1 = rXt(1−Xt)
with 0 < Xt < 1 and 0 < r < 4
(1)
Solving the equation for X as a function of t we have
X∗ = 1− 1/r (2)
This solution is stable for r ≤ 3; otherwise it is os-
cillatory. For r > 3.57 approximately, the oscillations
are infinitely complex; i.e. the dynamics are chaotic.
Since the solution cannot be written explicitly, to see
what it looks like we calculate successive values of X ,
while recognizing that these values become increasingly
approximate, and soon become entirely arbitrary — that
is, they become unpredictable even though the equation
generating them is deterministic. This can be dismissed
as simply due to the rounding errors that result from the
finite precision of the computer, but it is actually a con-
sequence of the interaction of the rounding errors with
the fractal nature of the attractor. The rate at which the
values evolve from precise to arbitrary is described by the
Lyapunov exponent. So while the system may look well
defined and timeless from an analytical point of view be-
cause the attractor determines the complete behaviour
of the system, in fact the attractor is unknowable an-
alytically, and can only be known (and only in a very
limited way) by iterating the equation, or by other iter-
ative techniques such as the one developed by Poincare´.
The iterations take place in time, and so it seems that
at least some of our knowledge of the behaviour of the
equation necessarily involves natural time. Note that a
physical process characterised by chaotic dynamics must
also be unpredictable in the long run, because as the pro-
cess “executes” it will be following a fractal attractor, and
the physical system that is executing the process, being
finite, will be subject to “rounding errors”, which in ef-
fect act as a stochastic perturbation. In other words, the
resolution that can be achieved by the physical system
is less than that of the attractor. This is the case with
the three body problem that Poincare´ was working on,
and the reason that the planetary trajectories of the solar
system are unpredictable at timescales beyond a hundred
million years or so. It is also, in Prigogine’s (1997) view,
the fundamental reason for the unpredictability of ther-
modynamic systems at the microscopic level (Laplace’s
demon cannot do the math well enough), and also a nec-
essary factor in macroscopic self-organization in that the
unpredictability permits symmetry breaking—Prigogine
calls this order by fluctuations.
5With chaotic systems, then, we lose the promise that
mathematics has traditionally provided of a precise,
God’s eye view over all time, and thus of certainty and
predictability. We are left only with calculations in nat-
ural time that give us rapidly decreasing accuracy and
hence increasing unpredictability. But from some points
of view this is not necessarily a problem. As Turing spec-
ulated in his discussion of learning, learning requires trial
and error, which would be pointless in a perfectly pre-
dictable world, and specifically it requires an element of
stochasticity. Many others have made the same observa-
tion – that stochasticity seems to be a necessary element
in any creative process. In physical systems stochastic
perturbations are the basis of the symmetry breaking by
which systems become increasingly complex and orga-
nized. Chaotic dynamics may thus play a positive role
by providing a necessary source of stochasticity in phys-
ical, biological, and human systems.
Physics, with the major exception of thermodynamics
(together with two very specific cases in particle physics:
CPT and a case of a heavy-fermion superconductor [11]),
is characterized by laws that are “time reversible” in the
sense that they remain valid if time runs backward. In
other words, time can be treated as a variable, t, and the
laws remain valid when −t is substituted for t. This is re-
ferred to by some (e.g. [12]) as spatialized time, because
we can travel in both directions in it, as we can in space.
Spatialized time is a conceptualization and representa-
tion of natural time, whereas natural time is the time
in which we and the world exist, independently of any
representation of it. Spatializing time is thus a way of
eliminating natural time by substituting a model for the
real thing. The physics of spatialized time is essentially a
timeless physics, since we have access to the entire corpus
of physical laws in the same sense that we have access to
the entire body of timeless mathematics.
The fact that time can be treated as a variable permits
the spectacularly accurate predictions that flow from
physical theory: the equations can be solved to show
the state of the system as a function of time, and thus
the state at any particular time, whether past, present
or future. This physics is in a deep sense deterministic.
This is true even of quantum physics, where, as Prigogine
[13] points out, the wave function evolves deterministi-
cally; uncertainty appears only when the wave function
collapses as a result of observation. The determinism
of spatialized time is the basis of Einstein’s famous re-
mark that “for us convinced physicists, the distinction
between past, present and future is an illusion, although
a persistent one” (as quoted in [13, p. 165]). His point
was that time as we experience it flowing inexorably and
irreversibly is an illusion; in relativistic space-time, the
reality that underlies our daily illusory existence, we have
access to all times. However, Prigogine [13] points out
that the space-time of relativity is not necessarily spa-
tialized; that is just the conventional interpretation. In
any case, because it is apparently timeless, the physics
of quantum theory and relativity is understood to rep-
resent our closest approximation to certain knowledge of
the world.
Thermodynamics represents a rude exception to this
timelessly serene picture. Here time has a direction, and
when it is reversed the physics doesn’t work quite the
same way. In the forward direction of time, the entropy
of an isolated system increases until it reaches the maxi-
mum possible value given local constraints. In this sense
the system is predictable. But when time is reversed, so
that entropy is progressively lowered, the system becomes
unpredictable, because, as Prigogine showed, when the
entropy of a system is lowered, an increasing number of
possible states appears, states that are macroscopically
quite distinct but have similar entropy levels. But only
one of these can actually exist, and in general we have
no certain way of knowing which one that will be. The
same phenomenon appears in reversed computation. In
other words the reversed time future is characterized by
a bifurcation tree of possibilities. Its future is open; it
is no longer deterministic or fully predictable, but rather
path dependent. This discussion of reversed time futures
applies to isolated systems, the ones for which thermo-
dynamic theory was developed. However, we do not live
in an isolated system. Our planet is bathed in solar en-
ergy, which keeps it far from equilibrium, and we supple-
ment this with increasing amounts of energy from other
sources. Thus our open-system world is equivalent to a
reversed time, isolated-system world. It is a world of path
dependency and open futures of a self-organizing system.
The open futures of these systems is a source of unpre-
dictability or uncertainty, just as is the uncertainty aris-
ing from chaotic dynamics, and the two work together.
In both of these situations in which unpredictability ap-
pears, time continues to be treated as a variable, but in
the case of far from equilibrium systems the behaviour is
time asymmetric: if we treat decreasing entropy as equiv-
alent to time reversal, physical systems are deterministic
in +t but undetermined in −t. In the case of chaotic
systems, while the process may be mathematically deter-
ministic in both +t and −t, the outcome is undetermined
for both directions of time. In both cases, since a math-
ematical treatment of the phenomenon is of limited use,
the preferred approach is computational. This is not just
a pragmatic choice. It reflects the poverty of spatialized
time compared to the possibilities offered by real time.
Whereas physics, with the major exception of thermody-
namics, is based on the assumption that spatialized time
captures all the characteristics of time that are essential
for a scientific understanding of the world, natural time
involves no assumptions. It is simply itself. A computer
can only implement an algorithm step by step, in natural
time. As a consequence, algorithms as they are executed
do not depend on any conceptualization or representa-
tion of time beyond a working assumption that time is
discontinuous or quantized, rather than continuous, an
assumption imposed by the computer’s clock.
6D. Emergence
Far from equilibrium, self-organizing systems are the
ones that we live in; our planet is essentially a spherical
bundle of such systems. The dynamics of plate tectonics
is driven by energy generated by radioactive decay in the
earth’s core; the complex behaviour of the oceans and
atmosphere is driven by the flux of solar energy; and life
itself, including human societies, also depends on the con-
tinuous input of energy from the sun. Self-organization
is a kind of emergence — it is the process by which an or-
ganized structure or pattern emerges from the collective
dynamics of the individual objects making up the sys-
tem, whether these are molecules of nitrogen and oxygen
organizing themselves into a cyclonic storm or individ-
ual people moving together to form an urban settlement.
However, as the phrase self-organization suggests, there
is no prior specification of the form that is to emerge, and
because of the inherent indeterminacy of far-from equilib-
rium systems, there is always a degree of uncertainty as to
exactly what form will appear, as well as where and when
it will emerge. These forms are essentially just patterns
in the collection of their constituent particles or objects.
Unlike their constituent objects, they have no existence
as independent entities, and they cannot, simply as pat-
terns, act on their environment — in other words, they
have no agency. For this reason the emergence of self-
organized systems is called soft or weak emergence.
Strong emergence, on the other hand, refers to the ap-
pearance of new objects, or new types of objects, in the
system. We can identify three levels of strong emergence:
1. In high energy physics, forces and particles emerge
through symmetry breaking. Unlike the increas-
ing energy input required to drive self-organization,
this process occurs as free energy in the system de-
creases and entropy increases.
2. At relatively moderate energy levels, physical sys-
tems produce an increasing variety of chemical
compounds. These molecules have an independent
existence and distinctive properties, like a charac-
teristic colour of solubility in water, that are not
simply the sum of the characteristics of their con-
stituent atoms. They also have a kind of passive
agency: for example, they can interact with each
other chemically to produce new molecules with
new properties, like a new colour. Of course they
can also interact physically, by means of collisions,
to produce weak emergence, for example in the
form of a convection cell or a cyclonic storm. But
chemical reactions can result in the simultaneous
occurrence of both strong and weak emergence, as
when reacting molecules and their products gener-
ate the macroscopic self-organized spiral patterns of
the Belosov-Zhabotinsky reaction. The production
of a particular molecule may either use or produce
free energy, i.e. it may be either entropy increasing
or entropy decreasing.
3. Also at relatively moderate energy levels, living sys-
tems emerge through chemical processes, but also
through self-assembly of larger structures (cells, or-
gans, organisms). The key characteristic of this
level of strong emergence is that the process is ini-
tiated and guided by an endogenous model of the
system and its relationship with its environment.
While in (1) and (2) emergence is determined by
the laws of physics, in this case it is determined
by the relevant models working together with the
laws of physics and chemistry. We include in living
systems the meta-systems of life such as ecological,
social, political, technological, and economic sys-
tems.
It is this third kind of strong emergence, the kind that
depends on and is guided by models, that is the focus
of our interest. Nevertheless the weak emergence of self-
organizing systems remains important in the context of
strong emergence, because a process of strong emergence,
as in the case of the development of a fertilised egg into a
mature multi-cellular individual, often makes use of local
self-organization. Furthermore, self-organized structures
are often the precursors of individuals with agency, mak-
ing the transition by means of a process of reification,
as when a self-organized settlement is incorporated as a
city, a process that endows it with independent agency.
In general, while self-organized systems are forced to a
state of lower entropy by an exogenously determined flux
of energy, living systems create and maintain their orga-
nized structures in order to proactively import energy
and thus maintain a state of lower entropy. The causal
circularity is a characteristic of such systems.
It is this third kind of strong emergence, the kind that
depends on and is guided by models, that is the focus
of our interest. Nevertheless the weak emergence of self-
organizing systems remains important in the context of
strong emergence, because a process of strong emergence,
as in the case of the development of a fertilised egg into a
mature multi-cellular individual, often makes use of local
self-organization. Furthermore, self-organized structures
are often the precursors of individuals with agency, mak-
ing the transition by means of a process of reification,
as when a self-organized settlement is incorporated as a
city, a process that endows it with independent agency.
In general, while self-organized systems are forced to a
state of lower entropy by an exogenously determined flux
of energy, living systems create and maintain their orga-
nized structures in order to proactively import energy
and thus maintain a state of lower entropy. The causal
circularity is a characteristic of such systems.
Model based systems are a qualitatively new type. The
models provide context dependent rules of behaviour that
supplement the effects of the laws of physics and chem-
istry. Of course we can always reduce the structures that
act as the models to their basic chemical components in
order to understand, for example, the chemical structure
of DNA or the chemistry of the synapses in a network
of neurons, and there are good reasons for doing this: it
7allows us to understand the underlying physical mecha-
nisms by which the model — and by extension the system
of which it is a part — functions. But this reduction to
chemistry and physics tells us nothing about how or why
the system as a whole exists. These questions can only be
answered at the level of the model considered as a model,
because it is the model that guides the creation and func-
tioning of the system of which it is a part. In other words,
the reductionist programme reveals the syntax of the sys-
tem, but tells us nothing of the semantics. It is the rules
of behaviour of the system as a whole, rules provided by
the model, that determine the actions of the system in its
environment, and thus, ultimately, its success in terms of
reproduction or survival. Part of the semantic content
of the model is therefore the teleonomic goal of survival.
The teleonomy is the result of the evolutionary process
that produced the system. In this sense evolution is the
ultimate source of semantics: as Dobzhansky said in the
famous title of his paper, ”Nothing in biology makes sense
except in the light of evolution” [14]. The mathemati-
cal biologist Robert Rosen [15][16] speculated that life,
rather than being a special case of physics and chem-
istry, in fact represents a generalization of those fields, in
the sense that a scientific explanation of life would reveal
new physics and chemistry. In other words the models
inherent in living systems could be seen as new physics
and chemistry: they introduce semantics as an emergent
property of physico-chemical systems.
1. Models
An interesting and useful definition of life, due to
Rosen [15], is that life consists of entities that contain
models of themselves, that is, entities that exist and func-
tion by virtue of the models they contain. The most basic
model is that coded in DNA. But neural systems also con-
tain models, some of them, as we know, very elaborate.
And of course some models are stored in external media
such as books and computers. These three loci of models
correspond to the three worlds of Karl Popper: World 1
is the world of physical existence, World 2 corresponds
to mental phenomena or ideas; and World 3 consists of
the externally stored and manipulated representations of
the ideas. Worlds 2 and 3 are not generally considered
by scientists to be constituents of the world that science
seeks to explain. However, as Popper points out, they
are in fact part of it, and exert causal powers on World
1 [17]. The implication is that a scientific understanding
of biological and social phenomena requires not just an
analysis at the level of physical and chemical causation,
but also consideration of the causal role of meaning, or
more specifically, meaning as embodied in models. Thus
semantics re-enters the picture in a fundamental way.
A model that is a part of a living system must be
a formal structure with semantics, not just syntax. It
can function as a model only by virtue of its semantic
content, since in order to be a model it must represent
another system, a system of which, in the case of liv-
ing organisms, it is itself usually a part. The modelled
system thus provides the model with its semantic con-
tent. As Rosen points out, this contradicts the orthodox
position of reductionist science (and in particular of New-
tonian particle physics) that “every material behaviour
[can] be...reduced to purely syntactical sequences of con-
figurations in an underlying system of particles” [16, p.68;
see also p.46ff].
Non-living systems lack semantics; they might thus
be characterised as identity models of themselves,
or zero-order models. Models associated with living
organisms (e.g. DNA or an idea of self) would then be
first order models. And some scientific models, those
that are models of models (e.g. a mathematical model
of DNA), would be second order models. This chapter is
concerned with first order models.
We propose the following definition:
a is a first order model of A, i.e. a is a functional
representation of A (a r A), if
1. a is a structure (not just a collection) of appro-
priate elements in some medium, whether chemical
(e.g. a DNA molecule composed of amino acids),
cellular (e.g. a synaptic structure in a network of
neurons), or symbolic (e.g. a program composed
of legitimate statements in some programming lan-
guage).
2. The structure a can act as an algorithm when exe-
cuted on some suitable machine M , where M may
be either separate from A (e.g. a computer run-
ning a model of an economic system), or some part
of A (e.g. a bacterial cell running the behavioural
model coded in its DNA);
3. The output of the algorithm corresponds to or con-
sists of some characteristics of A. Specifically:
(a) Given a suitable environment, a running on M
can create a new instance of A (e.g. in the envi-
ronment provided by a warm egg, the DNA being
run by the egg cell containing the DNA can create a
new instance of the kind of organism that produced
the egg).
(b) a can guide the behaviour of A in response to
certain changes in the state of the environment (e.g.
on the arrival of night, go to your nest; if inflation
is greater than 3 percent, raise the interest rate).
4. 3(a) and 3(b) are evolved (or in human World 3
systems, designed) capabilities or functions that in
general serve to maximise the chance of survival of
A.
5. If A is a living organism, r is an emergent property
of the underlying physical and chemical systems.
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tive. Although the output of a when executed on M is
literally a response to a current condition c which repre-
sents input to a , because of the evolutionary history of a
that brought it into existence, the behaviour of A in re-
sponse to a is actually a response to a future, potentially
detrimental, condition c’ predicted by a ; in other words,
on the basis of the current condition c, a predicts that
c’ will occur, and as a consequence produces a response
in A intended to prevent the occurrence of c’ or mitigate
its impact. Thus a acts as a predictive algorithm, and
guides the behaviour of A on the basis of its predictions.
The model a is thus rich in time. It involves both past
time (the time in which it evolved) and future time (the
time of its prediction), as well as, during execution, the
natural time of the present. This reminds us of Bergson’s
[1, p.20] observation regarding natural (”concrete”) time:
”the whole of the past goes into the making of the living
being’s present moment.” Only if we know already about
evolution as a process can we see the three times present
in a . Only by virtue of being such a system ourselves do
we have the ability to perceive its purpose.
In this three-time aspect, a as it represents A is fun-
damentally different from a purely chemical or physical
phenomenon in the conventional sense. It has seman-
tic content which would be eliminated by any possible
reduction to the purely mechanical causation of chemi-
cal and physical events. From a reductionist standpoint
we would see only chemical reactions, nothing of repre-
sentation, purpose, past, or anticipation. On the other
hand, since a does actually have this semantic content,
that content must emerge in the chemical system itself.
It does so by virtue of the relationship between the part
of the system that constitutes a and the larger system
that is being modelled, just as a molecular property like
solubility in water emerges from interactions among the
atoms making up the molecule. In this sense Rosen was
correct that life represents a radical extension of chem-
istry and physics: at no point do we require a vital prin-
ciple or a soul to breathe semantics, or even life, into
chemistry.
In the specific case of DNA, as a molecule it is essen-
tially fixed from the point of view of the organism: over
that timescale, as a molecule, it is timeless. But natural
time appears as the organism develops following concep-
tion, when various genes are turned on or off, and this
behaviour continues in the fully developed organism as
its interactions with the environment are guided by vari-
ous contingently activated combinations of genes. In that
sense DNA acts as a model that changes as a result of
its interactions with the modelled system of which it is a
part. This is reminiscent of the chained Turing machines
proposed by Turing to permit creativity. Neural models,
in contrast, lack a comprehensive fixed structure analo-
gous to that of DNA; they are open ended and develop or
change continually as a result of interactions with their
host organism and the environment. But in both cases,
as a computational system, life is essentially a case of
open ended computation.
2. Information
The model of a system represents information, and its
role in the functioning of the system depends on its be-
ing treated as information by the system. Note that this
is information in the sense of semantics, or meaningful
information, rather than Shannon information, which is
semantics-free and represents information capacity or po-
tential information. In other words, we could say that
while semantics represents the content or meaning of in-
formation, Shannon information represents its quantity,
and syntax represents its structure. Shannon information
is maximised when a system is in its maximum entropy
state. In the case of a self-organized system, the macro-
scale pattern constrains the behaviour of the constituent
particles so that the system’s entropy and hence its Shan-
non information is less than it would be if its particles
were unconstrained by the self-organized structures.
We do not know of a measure of semantic informa-
tion; it seems unlikely that such a measure could even
be defined. Nevertheless, it seems that the model is the
means by which semantic content emerges from syntax.
We speculate that it is ultimately the teleonomic nature
of living systems that populates the vacant lands of Shan-
non information with the semantics of meaning-laden in-
formation. A model embedded in a living system does
not simply represent some aspect of another system; it
does so purposefully. In living systems, the function of
the model is to guide the behaviour of the system of
which it is a part, and it does this by predicting future
states of both the system and its environment. System
behaviour thus depends to some degree on the antici-
pated future state of the system and its environment —
i.e. the behaviour is goal directed. In contrast, in the
case of traditional feedback systems, behaviour depends
on the current state of the system and its environment.
We note the apparent irony that life, a system that de-
pends for its origin and evolution on uncertainty, never-
theless depends for its survival on an ability to predict
future states. In fact, it requires a balance of predictabil-
ity and unpredictability. In Langton’s [18] terms, it exists
on the boundary between order and chaos.
3. Agency
First order models emerged with life in an evolutionary
process, one in which the model both depends on and fa-
cilitates the persistence of the system of which it is a part.
The model thus necessarily has a teleonomic quality —
its purpose is ultimately to enhance the likelihood of its
own survival and that of the host system that implements
it. To this end, the model endows its host system with
agency — i.e. it transforms the system into an agent that
can act independently. The relationship between model
9and evolutionary process, the basis of strong emergence,
seems fundamental: each seems to be necessary for the
other. This is in a sense the basic assumption of the the-
ory of biological evolution. In contrast, a self-organized
system, the result of weak emergence, does not act inde-
pendently to ensure its own persistence. Living systems,
by virtue of their agency, act to maintain themselves in
a state of low entropy.
E. Creative Algorithms
The models that guide the generation and behaviour of
living systems are necessarily self-referential, since they
are models of a system of which they are an essential
part. This means that they cannot be represented purely
as mathematical structures. However, if the mathemati-
cal structures are appropriately embedded in algorithms
being executed in natural time, the problem disappears.
Nevertheless, the definition of algorithm remains crucial.
Rosen, with deep roots in mathematics, was never quite
able to resolve the problems arising from self-reference
because he worked with Turing’s definition of algorithm;
this is clear when he claims, repeatedly, that life is not al-
gorithmic. But as we have noted, the Turing machine was
defined in such a way as to produce only results that are
consistent with time-free mathematics. To generate that
mathematics, the Turing machine must be supplemented
by a source of learning or creativity. Learning and cre-
ativity are essential characteristics of living systems, as is
the appearance of new entities with agency, which learn-
ing and creativity make possible. Consequently, a formal
understanding of life must include a formal treatment
of learning, creativity and strong emergence. That re-
quires algorithms that transcend Turing’s definition. It
requires algorithms that are able to model their own be-
haviour and alter themselves on the basis of their models
of themselves. Using a computer operating in natural
time to execute only Turing algorithms is like insisting
on using three dimensional space to do only two dimen-
sional geometry: it is a colossal waste of capacity as well
as a refusal to consider the unfolding world of possibilities
that emerge in natural time.
III. FURTHER EXPLORATIONS ON THE ROLE
OF TIME IN SCIENCE
We have gotten so used to the concept of creativity and
completely new solutions to problems, or to inventions
that make our life easier and are introduced the first time,
that we tend to overlook the principle aspect of creating
new things.
In the daily processes of synthetic chemistry, for exam-
ple, new molecules are generated every day by combin-
ing existing molecules into new combinations. Given the
enormous extent of the combinatorial space of chemistry,
we have to presume that some of those are created the
very first time.
If some of these compounds are stable and created to-
day in the Universe for the first time – note we speak of
actual realization of material compounds, as opposed to
the mere possibility of their existence being “discovered”
– they come with a time stamp of today. Thus, every
material substance or object has in some way attached
to it a time stamp of when it or its earlier copies first
appeared in the Universe. Time, therefore, is of abso-
lute importance to everything that exists and is able to
characterize it in some way.
Can we make use of that in the Sciences? Here, we
want to look at the two sciences that provide modeling
tools for others to use in their effort to model the material
universe, mathematics and computer science.
A. Mathematics
We have already mentioned that mathematics uses the
concept of time (if at all) in a spatial sense. This means,
time can be considered as part of a space that can be tra-
versed in all directions. Notably, it can be traversed back-
ward in time! But mathematics is actually mostly con-
cerned about the unchanging features of the objects and
transformations it has conceptualized. Thus, it glosses
over, or even ignores changes in features, as they could
prevent truth from getting established. For instance,
a mathematical proof is a set of transformations of a
statement into the values “true” or “false”, values that
are unchanging and not dynamic. This reliability is its
strength. Once a statement is established to be true, it is
accepted into the canon of mathematically proven state-
ments, and can serve as an intermediate for other proof
transformations.
But what about a mathematics of time? How would
such a mathematics look like? We don’t know yet, per-
haps because the notion of time is something many math-
ematicians look at with suspicion, and rather than asking
how such a mathematics would look like, they ask them-
selves whether time exists at all and how they can prove
that it does not exist — except as an illusion in our con-
ciousness [19]. Although Science has always worked like
that — ignoring what it cannot explain and focusing on
phenomena it can model and explain — we have reached
a point now where we simply cannot ignore the nature of
time any more as a concept that is key to our modeling
of natural systems.
So let’s offer another speculation here. We said be-
fore that every object in the universe carries a prop-
erty with it we can characterize as a time stamp, stating
when it first appeared. This is one of its unalienable
properties, whether we want to consider it or not. So
how about imagining that every mathematical object and
all the statements and transformations in mathematics
would come with the feature of a time stamp? In other
words, besides its other properties, an object, statement
or transformation would carry a new property, the time
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when it was first created. This would help sort out some
of the problems when trying to include the creation of
mathematics into mathematics itself. It would actually
give us a way of characterizing how mathematics is cre-
ated by mathematicians. The rule would be that new
objects, statements and transformations can only make
use of what is already in existence at the time of their
own creation.
Once we have achieved such a description, can we make
a model of the process? Perhaps one of the natural things
to ask is whether it would be possible to at least guess
which objects, statements or transformations could be
created next? The situation is a reminder of the “adja-
cent possible” of Kaufmann who proposed that ecological
systems inhabit a state space that is constantly expand-
ing through accessing “adjacent” states that increase its
dimensionality. What this includes is a notion that only
what interacts with the existing (which we can call “the
adjacent”) could be realized next. Everything else would
be a creatio ex nihilo and likely never be realized.
Here is an example: Suppose we have a set of differen-
tial rate equations that describe a system at the current
state. For simplicity, let’s assume that all the variables
of the system carry a time stamp of this moment. Sup-
pose now that we want to introduce a new variable, for
another quantity that develops according to a new dif-
ferential rate equation. Would it make sense to do that
even without any coupling of this new variable to the
existing system? We don’t think it would. In fact, the
very nature of our wish to introduce this variable has
to do with its interaction with the system as it is cur-
rently described. Thus, introducing a variable that can
describe the adjacent possible has at least to have some
interaction with the current system.
Dynamic set theory [20] is an example of how this could
work. Dynamic set theory was inspired by the need to
deal with sets of changing elements in a software simu-
lation. Mathematically, normal sets are static, in that
membership in a set does not change over time. But dy-
namic sets allow just that: Sets can be defined over time
intervals T , and might contain certain elements at certain
times only. For example, if you have a set of elements
X = {a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, c3}
we can assign specific dynamic sets to a time interval T
as follows
AT = {(t1, {a1, b1, c1}), (t2, {a2, b1}), (tT , ∅)}
and
BT = {(t1, {a1, a2}), (t3, {a3, c1, c3}), (tT , ∅)}
We can then manipulate these sets using set operations,
for instance:
AT ∩BT = {(t1, {a1}), (tT , ∅)} (3)
or
AT ∪BT = {(t1, {a1, a2, b1, c1}), (t2, {a2, b1}),
(t3, {a3, c1, c3}), (tT , ∅)}
(4)
We can see here that each of these elements is tagged with
a particular time at which they are part of the dynamic
set, and can take part in set operations for that particular
moment.[21] A generalization of set theory is possible to
this case. Our hope is that — ultimately — mathematics
will be able to access the constructive, intuitional aspects
of its own creation. Once we have assigned the additional
property of time/age to mathematical objects, perhaps
its generative process can be modeled.
Another example of mathematical attempts at captur-
ing time in mathematics is real-time process algebra [22].
The idea of this approach is to try to describe formally
what a computational system is able to do, in particular
its dynamic behavior. This project of formalization was
generalized under the heading of “denotational mathe-
matics” [23, 24].
These are all interesting attempts to capture the effect
of time within the framework of Mathematics, but they
fall short of the goal, because they are descriptive in na-
ture, i.e. they are not generative and able to create novel
structures, processes or variables themselves.
B. Computer Science
Computers allow the execution of mathematical mod-
els operationalized as algorithms. But as we have seen
from the discussion in this chapter, mathematics cur-
rently deals with spatialized time, not real, natural time.
Thus, if we were to only aim at simulating mathemati-
cal models, we do not need natural time. This is indeed
Turing’s definition of an algorithm, restricted exactly in
the way required to make sure that it cannot do anything
that requires natural time, so that the computer execut-
ing a Turing algorithm is only doing what, in principle,
timeless mathematics can do. Here, instead, we aim for
algorithms to execute on machines that need to go be-
yond traditional mathematical models.
We need to provide operations within our algorithms
that allow for modification of models. Let us briefly con-
sider how variables (potential observables of the behavior
of a [simulated] model) are realized in a computer: They
are handled using the address of their memory location.
Thus if we allow memory address manipulations in our
algorithms, like allocating memory for new variables, or
garbage collection (for variables/memory locations that
have fallen out of use), we should be able to modify at
least certain aspects of a model (the variables). Since the
address space of a computer is limited, memory locations
can be described by integer numbers in a certain range,
so we are able to modify them during execution.
Of course, variables are but one class of entities that
need to be modified from within the code. Reflective
computer languages allow precisely this type of manip-
ulation [25]. Reflection describes the ability of a com-
puter language to modify its own structure and behavior.
Mostly interpreted languages have been used for reflec-
tion, yet more modern approaches like SELF offer com-
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piling capabilities, based on an object-oriented model. As
Sobel and Friedman write: “Intuitively, reflective compu-
tational systems allow computations to observe and mod-
ify properties of their own behavior, especially proper-
ties that are typically observed only from some external,
meta-level viewpoint” [26]. What seems to make SELF
particularly suitable is its ability to manipulate methods
and variables in the same framework. In fact, there is no
difference in SELF between them. Object classes are not
based on an abstract collection of properties and their
inheritance in instantiation, but on prototype objects,
object copy and variation. We believe that SELF allows
an easier implementation of an evolutionary system than
other object-oriented languages.
Susan Stepney’s work [27] in the context of the CoS-
MoS project provides a good discussion of the poten-
tial of reflective languages to allow to capture emergent
phenomena through self-modification. In order for a self-
modifying system not to sink into a chaotic mess, though,
we probably shall need again to time stamp the genera-
tion of objects.
However, the open-ended power of those systems might
only come into its own when one of the key aspects of
natural time is respected as well — the fact that one
cannot exit natural time. This calls for systems that are
not terminated. Natural open-ended processes like scien-
tific inquiry or economic activity or biological evolution
do not allow termination and restart. While objects in
those systems might have a limited lifetime, entire sys-
tems are not “rebooted”. Instead, new objects have to be
created and integrated into the dynamics of the existing
systems.
We return here to a theme already mentioned with Tur-
ing machines: The traditional idea of an algorithm, while
having to make use of natural time during its execution
as a step-by-step process, attempts to ignore time by re-
quiring the algorithm to halt. Traditional algorithms are
thus constructed to halt for their answer to be consid-
ered definitive. This, in fact, makes them closed system
approaches to computation, as opposed to streaming pro-
cesses, that analyze data continuously and provide tran-
sient answers at any time [28]. We might want to ask:
What are the requirements for systems that do not end,
i.e. do not exit natural time? [29]
C. OTHER SCIENCES
In this contribution we do not have enough space to
discuss in detail how natural phenomena as encoun-
tered in simple and complex systems can inform the
corresponding sciences — which attempt to model those
phenomena (physics, chemistry, biology, ecology and
economy) — about natural time. But we believe it is
important to emphasize that a clear distinction should
be made between our modeling attempts and the actual
phenomena underlying them. In the past, there were
times when the model and the reality were conceptually
not separated. For instance, the universe was considered
like clockwork, or later as a steam engine, and even
later as a giant computer. All of these attempts to
understand the universe mistook the underlying system
for its metaphor.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our argument here is not that the Universe is a giant
computer [30], preferably running an irreducible compu-
tation [31]. This would interchange the actual system
with the model of it. Rather, our argument is that time is
so fundamental to the Universe that we need tools (com-
puters) and formalisms (algorithms) that rely on natural
time to be able to faithfully model its phenomena. We
believe that there are many phenomena in the natural
and artificially made world making use of novelty, in-
novation, emergence, or creativity, which have resisted
modeling attempts with current techniques. We think
those phenomena are worth the effort to change our con-
cepts in order to accommodate them into our world view
and allow us to develop models. As hard as it might be
to do that, what would Science be without taking stock
of what is out there in the world and attempting to in-
corporate it in our modelling efforts?
This essay was written on the occasion of the
Festschrift for Susan Stepney’s 60th birthday. It is ded-
icated to Susan, whose work has been so inspiring and
deep.
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